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#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

27 December 1955

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 87-55

SUBJECT: New NIE on Communist Capabilities and Intentions vis-a-vis

- l. At the IAC Raps meeting on the new Estimative Program both OIR and G-2 urged that an NIE or SNIE be done assessing in particular what the CDR and Soviet could and would do about Berlin, in view of the new situation which now obtains in Germany. We and the other IAC Reps accepted this NIE for submission to the IAC by 21 February.
- 2. Attached is a brief set of T/R's prepared by the EE Staff. In view of the short deadline we propose sending these out as soon as possible and calling for contributions no later than 20 January. We suggest asking for telephone concurrence on these T/R's unless any IAC agency wants a meeting.

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Chief, Estimates Staff

DECUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 

1) DECLASSITIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE: 12 M xxxx SIREVIEWER: 018557

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DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 11-3 -56: "Soviet Intentions and Capabilities in Barlin"

## I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN BERLIN

- Lo Describe briefly the physical situation in Berlino What Western, Soviet, and German forces are deployed in and about Greater Berlin? What means of access are available to Western forces? How vulnerable is West Berlin economically to closing of transport routes from West Germany?
- 2. Has the granting of sovereignty to West and East Germany altered the legal situation based on earlier Four Power agreements? To what extent, if any, have the GDR and the USSR thus far challenged Western rights in Barlin based on those agreements?

## II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN BERLIN

- 1. In the light of probable Soviet policy in Germany, what are the USSR's probable long-term objectives with respect to Berlin?
- 2. Has recent Soviet behavior thrown any light on the USSR\*s shorter term objectives? What indications have there been? What do they imply?

## III. SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN BERLIN

L. What range of actions could the USSR undertake to achieve the above objectives? Discuss each specific action in as much detail as feasible citing Communist resources to undertake it, and the likely impact if successful.

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#### IV. PROBABLE SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION

- 1. What limiting factors such as risk of war or Western capability to take counter-weasures would affect the exercise of Soviet capabilities in Berlin?
- 2. In the light of the above objectives and capabilities, and bearing in mind broader considerations of over-all Soviet Policy, what are the likely Soviet courses of action affecting Berlin?

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